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Foreword 
The central themes of this theoretical work draw heavily on the social-
psychological and historical interpretations produced by Philip Zimbardo and 
Christopher Browning, respectively.  Though this is a case-study of the control system 
which would ultimately be implemented by the Nazis during their reign of control in 
Germany from 1933 to 1945, it is important to understand that the ideas put forth here 
are not intended to insinuate that manipulations of culture have been confined to a 
single epoch, rather they occur and have occurred throughout time.  The contention 
here is that the immediate history of the German state, the pre-existing fodder for in-
group and out-group distinctions, and the authoritative political and social structures 
combined with the ideological rhetoric and material tactics of the National Socialists to 
facilitate participation in atrocities by zealots and ordinary citizens alike. 
The work includes an introduction which shall serve to define the terms that will 
be discussed throughout, three middle sections titled “Germany and the Populace,” 
“Hitler and Himmler,” and “Hitler‟s Agents,” and a conclusion to summarize the main 
ideas.  This structure corresponds to the different levels of investment in and modes of 
engagement with Nazi policies.  “Germany and the Populace” provides an overview of 
the immediate history of the German state as well as the experience of the ordinary 
people under Nazi control.  The section “Hitler and Himmler” contrasts the mindset of 
two leaders of the Third Reich.  “Hitler‟s Agents” is intended to indicate the 
disassociation of the Wehrmacht or regular German Army from Nazi police entities and 
their auxiliaries which are the focus of the discussion.   
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Introduction 
 In June of 1941 Adolf Hitler unleashed his “war of annihilation” against the Soviet 
Union.  By this time Germany had grown out of the economic ruin which it had endured 
in the years following World War I, and experienced again following the crash of 1929, 
to become one of the most powerful nations on Earth.  The government‟s conception 
of what they deemed an ethnic community bound by blood created a strong internal 
will amongst the populace to contribute to this new society.  The military was educated 
in their racial superiority and fought against anyone who believed otherwise.  The 
leaders of this nation believed so strongly in their ideological views that some even lost 
touch with sanity.  What developed in Germany was an alternate culture, comprising a 
set of cognitive possibilities allowing people's perceptions to overwrite what one might 
expect to have been accepted ideals and moral standards of an advanced western 
population.  The Nazi culture made common sense out of ignorance, clouded the 
mind, and redefined the order of moral values.  Such a variance in cultural 
understanding can arise out of a system‟s creation and manipulation of situational 
forces.  The strong Nazi system of control was able to take advantage of pre-existing 
situational forces to create and manipulate their own in order to facilitate the existence 
of their own culture, ultimately leading to the Holocaust, the most destructive war in 
history, and some of the worst wartime atrocities ever witnessed.  This work therefore will 
seek to highlight aspects of the Nazi system which created situational forces capable of 
altering culturally accepted norms.  Depending on the division of society, this 
acceptance of a new culture had the power to manifest malevolent innate 
characteristics and manipulate the group and the individual towards a path of, as 
viewed by those outside of the Nazi culture, evil, inhumanity, and indifference. 
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 In order for a systemically manufactured culture to exist, there must be a system 
capable of creating one. 1  A well entrenched system capable of bringing about such 
subordination of groups and individuals requires three pillars of support: authority, 
identification, and fear.2  Authority provides the justification to rule just as fear 
subsequently prevents the subordinates from questioning said authority.  Identification 
by the groups and individuals with their ruler or ruler‟s set of ideals blinds their human 
predisposition to question their respective roles.  The theories presented in this work are 
not confined to a single epoch and are even evinced within religious institutions such as 
the Catholic Church.  The authority is said to stem from God, therefore the Pope (God‟s 
earthly representative), and a conceptual identification with religious figures or their 
livelihoods such as saints, leaders, and Christ himself.  The Pope‟s justification of authority 
has come through his election by the College of Cardinals.  The fear and avoidance of 
sin caused by the threat of eternal damnation has been preached thousands of years, 
keeping every self-loving Christian from questioning this authority stemming from old 
Christian “tradition” (Weber 36).  Thus when Christian knights in the Crusades were 
ordered by their rulers to destroy preachers and followers of infidelity, they did so 
without question, for to be a successful Crusader was to guarantee a place in Heaven.  
The fact that they actively broke the Commandment “You shall not kill” was forgiven by 
the Pope as they were seen as doing so in service to God.    
                                                          
1 A set of rules or laws created by an entity and enforced by agents possessing some sort of 
authority.  To call a system a “control system” is to insinuate a high level of censorship, such as 
that within a police state.  Here system is used in most cases to refer to a specific government.  
Though a system can also be thought of as a religious institution, a military, etc.  
2 Another possibility might be love and admiration; this, however, as suggested by Niccolo 
Machiavelli in his famous work The Prince, creates a greater susceptibility to assassination, 
because it is assumed that a loved dictator would be predisposed towards returning such 
affection and therefore lower his guard.  Hitler happened to benefit from both, as well as often 
enjoying them simultaneously depending on the makeup of his audience. 
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 These pillars also existed within Nazism.  After the failure of his November 1923 
coup attempt in Munich, Hitler‟s subsequent methods allowed him to assume power 
through legal means in 1933, ensuring a much greater sense of legitimacy behind his 
authority.  Hitler‟s authority was founded in “charisma,” as he was viewed by many as a 
sort of savior (Weber 36).  Once having assumed power, the legitimacy of his 
administration was kept from question by the shroud of police and informants who 
created a vast aura of not only fear throughout the population, but also a high level of 
uncertainty, uncertainty about the future, the whereabouts of those who had been 
arrested, and the new demands of this dictatorship.  The Nazis effectively catered their 
policy to whomever they were speaking in any given venue, thus allowing for a level of 
identification to stem from almost every aspect of German society (Allen 193).        
The influence of a control system is entirely dependent upon the mutual strength 
of its pillars of support.  Authority existing without any perceived legitimacy and held in 
place solely by fear cannot be expected to last for any significant period of time.  
Existence of this illegitimate authority is often the case in developing countries whose 
governments are regularly overthrown by coups, often violently.  Without the 
perception of legitimacy these governments only last until the next coup or uprising.  
Likewise, fear absent authority is nothing more than terrorism.  Terrorists seek to create 
fear as a means of enforcing their will, but without any perceived authority backing 
them up, their efforts become endless.  This is the problem that the Taliban creates in 
Afghanistan.  They actively promote an aura of fear among villagers but have no 
authority to rule (it was eliminated by NATO and the Northern Alliance) short of their 
specific interpretation of Islam, however the fear that they create prevails over any 
loyalty that the villagers may have to their new government which does not have the 
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means to protect them.  Thus a state of limbo will exist until NATO is either able to 
eradicate the Taliban fighters, or until NATO leaves and the Taliban is able to reestablish 
their authority.  Identification with like-minded ideals is necessary to take the last step in 
building a loyalty within a population.  Without this sense of identification the number of 
dissidents will be significant enough to weaken any new cultural acceptance so that it 
is never fully recognized.  Upon the strong support of these pillars a control system 
becomes erected.  It will not decay by means of internal factors alone.  Over time 
these pillars will only decay through a prevalence of conflicting external and internal 
factors.  The Nazi control system met with destruction primarily due to external factors, 
i.e. war, though towards the end it also began to crumble from within through various 
coup attempts and power struggles within the upper leadership.  However, the 
absence of these factors makes it impossible for a control system to crumble entirely 
from within.  Once having become entrenched, a control system develops and furthers 
an ability to manipulate situational forces, creating its own culture.  In so doing, it is able 
to control the actions of its subordinates as well as draw innate feelings to surface level.  
Now that the makeup of effective control systems is understood, the next 
question becomes: what are these situational forces that the control system is able to 
manipulate in order to create new cultural boundaries and bring out innate human 
propensities to violence on a large scale?  The forces involved include, but are not 
strictly limited to, the presence of superiors with perceived legitimate authority, 
dehumanization and deindividuation of so-called enemies, political apathy, endurance 
of hardship (economic, social, and/or political), and nationalism. 3  The existence of 
                                                          
3
 Deindividuation has two different meanings, both of which are argued here to be situational 
forces on their own.  The first is the loss of one‟s own personal identification when operating 
within a group.  The second is the elimination of an enemy‟s identity, comparable to 
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these forces is dependent upon the existence of a control system.  Specifically which 
forces exist and how they are managed is dependent upon the strength of the control 
system‟s pillars of support. 
Many unthinkable actions are often brought about by the presence of systemic 
superiors.  The subordinates to this figure feel compelled to do as they are ordered and 
are reassured that what they are doing is necessary.  They have no reason to think for 
themselves, as this greater power is perceived as such and has convincingly endorsed 
their proposed actions.  Ultimately they have been slightly manipulated by the 
encouragement of their superior who has effectively used his or her position to 
influence subordinate behavior through their own sanctification.  Adolf Hitler himself 
summarized this phenomenon in the following statement, “What luck for rulers that 
people do not think” (Fest 576).4  This is a primary factor when considering any case of 
sanctioned mass murder.  An ordinary person in democratic society today easily comes 
to the conclusion that had a soldier simply questioned his actions or the commands of 
his officer, that soldier would have refused to commit such an act. 5  However, that 
same person lacks the ability to fathom the intricate network of cognitive processes, or 
some might say lack thereof, which the influence of the control system has conjured.  
Stanley Milgram‟s study of obedience helps explain this “ordinary person‟s” lack of 
understanding. 6  Partly inspired by the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dehumanization but at the individual, i.e. one on one, level.  To prevent confusion, the first 
example will be referred to as “personal deindividuation” and the second as “deindividuation of 
others”.  
4
 “Was für ein Glück für die Regierenden, dass die Menschen nicht denken.“ 
5 Regardless of the form of government, militaries are control systems, thought they exist within 
larger systems. 
6
 In Milgram‟s experiment there are three parties.  The “teacher” (the unwitting subject) shocks the “learner” 
(a confederate) with a progressively increased voltage each time the learner incorrectly answers a 
question.  The teacher is able to hear the cries of pain, etc. of the learner but is urged to continue by the 
experimenter (a superior) until the maximum voltage is reached or the teacher refuses to continue. 
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Milgram‟s experiment gave a shocking glimpse into the willingness of people to do as 
they are told, as the ordinary person who shocked each victim did so out of a sense of 
obligation rather than any abnormally violent or destructive tendencies (Milgram 187).  
The results of this experiment thus served to strengthen, to a frightening degree, Hannah 
Arendt‟s concept of the banality of evil, i.e. the suggestion that evils such as the 
Holocaust are not precipitated solely, perhaps not even to any large degree, by 
fanatics or sociopaths, but rather by normal individuals who have chosen to adhere to 
the principles set in place by their, in this case, governmental system in order to 
advance their careers and protect their way of life (186).  In essence, the moral 
obligations of ordinary people were reordered.  The obligation to “do one‟s duty” 
became more important than the obligation not to commit murder (Sabini & Silver 201).  
Another situational force, dehumanization, serves to amplify exponentially the 
obedience of a subordinate.  Dehumanization is the process in which enemies of a 
particular system are molded to be seen as having non-human characteristics, making 
them less than human.  Military action in general does this both intentionally and 
unintentionally.  It is easier to kill someone whose life is not seen as having equal value 
as other humans, and enemy forces, the subjects of propaganda in this particular case, 
are targeted this way.  The unintentional side is the fact that a soldier‟s comrades are 
being killed by this common enemy, an enemy who holds different values and who is 
killing those people close to that soldier.  In this way personal feelings of vengeance are 
unintentionally triggered by the enemy.  As a result, the enemy is distanced to the point 
where they, in view of the soldier, are not of equal stature.  Dehumanization is witnessed 
in differing degrees.  Racism plays a major role, as it is easier to dehumanize an enemy 
who differs in physical appearance.  The success of the Nazis in dehumanizing those 
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they determined to be Volksfeinde (enemies of the people) coincides with the 
systematic mass murder of the latter and will be revisited in further detail later.   
Already noted was the intensifying effect created by learned dehumanization 
among groups and individuals subject to an immediate presence of systemic superiors.   
It must also be recognized that expressions of intrinsic feelings and thoughts can also 
occur in the absence of these superiors, once again due to the effects of 
dehumanization.  As previously suggested, actions are the mark of successful systemic 
training whether intended or not, as the following examples will illustrate.  The group or 
individual uses what they have been taught, i.e. what the system would expect.  The 
Nazi foot soldier who acts on his own accord and guns down a group of Jews without 
being commanded to do so has been affected by situational forces in a way that he 
no longer recognizes a need to question his actions or the consequences thereof.  He 
has effectively assumed a role within a realm of in-group vs. out-group hostility which 
the Nazis have created, the Volksgemeinschaft (national community) vs. those who 
have been deemed enemies of the nation.   
In so doing, the system has perverted the fundamental human need to belong 
into excessive conformity and compliance (Zimbardo 230).  A contemporary military 
example of dehumanization in the absence of superiors, which Philip Zimbardo 
discusses extensively in his book The Lucifer Effect, is that of the abuses perpetrated by 
American military police against Iraqi prisoners of war at Abu Ghraib Prison.  This is a 
situation in which governmental and military ideologies come to head.  A pluralist 
democracy such as the contemporary United States, as long as they house political 
interest groups and lobbies made up of minority populations, does not seek to 
dehumanize specific ethnic groups as did the Nazis.  However, one cannot 
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underestimate the fundamental requirement of a soldier (i.e. military on a larger scale) 
to dehumanize his or her enemy.  Why?  How is it possible to repeatedly kill (which is 
what soldiers are trained to do) others whom one does not consider to be less than 
human and therefore deserving of death?  In response to the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution the Soviets largely used divisions consisting of troops from Asia rather than 
Europe in a successful effort to augment the dehumanization of Hungarian separatists 
racially in addition to politically, because it was harder to do politically, as many felt a 
similar need for protest.  As difficult as it is to consider for a nation consisting of a largely 
cosmopolitan attitude, American soldiers too are forced to dehumanize their enemy.  
The MPs managing the prison in Baghdad heard continual reports of their friends and 
allies being killed by suicide bombers and guerrilla fighters.  Not subject to constant 
supervision, these soldiers who had essentially become bored, decided to implement 
their own methods of interrogation against these, as they saw them, less than human 
prisoners (Zimbardo 352).  In many of the photographs the detainees are naked.  For 
prison guards, stripping detainees is a specific method of dehumanization.7  Being 
naked is against the traditional norm, therefore naked or partially naked prisoners who 
are in the presence of fully clothed guards essentially creates a situation in which they 
are perceived as less than human, as was the case in the Stanford Prison Experiment 
(SPE), Abu Ghraib, and Nazi extermination camps.8 
A simple analysis of a particular element within the SPE will illustrate the 
difference between dehumanization and deindividuation of others.  By forcing the 
                                                          
7 Stripping detainees is a side-effect of othering created in the absence of immediate authority.  
A greater sense of power over the detainees is felt by the prison guards, making them more 
ambitious.  
8
 (SPE) Controversial study conducted by Dr. Philip Zimbardo at Stanford University to show the psychological 
effects on ordinary students forced to transition into the roles of prison guards and inmates. 
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prisoners to strip naked, the guards effectively dehumanized them.  They were no 
longer on the same level, so to speak.  Each prisoner was given a number.  The number 
replaced their name and was written on their smocks.  They were no longer referred to 
by their names but rather their numbers, this became their new identity.  This made it 
difficult for the guards to identify with the prisoners on a personal level, thus effectively 
deindividuating them.  The same holds true within Nazi Germany.  Railroad workers who 
were, in most cases, sending Jews to their presumed deaths felt no personal 
identification with them.  Many in Germany took solace in the thought that the Jews 
whom they did know, they treated with respect, effectively distancing themselves from 
the work that the Nazis were doing, thus feeling relief from any sense of responsibility. 
Perpetrators of genocidal executions are always part of a group.  This group 
creates an atmosphere of anonymity, easing individual transition into total susceptibility.  
Zimbardo references this as the “Mardi Gras effect,” a label given to the feeling of 
personal deindividuation experienced by an individual when he or she is part of a 
group (367).  The individual is caught up in the actions of the group and personal 
identity is erased along with any sense of responsibility that might otherwise have been 
felt.  Just as the old adage “safety in numbers” would suggest, so too do these 
individuals feel a sense of security within this realm of perceived anonymity.        
Fear, discussed already as a systemic support mechanism, of course, is also an 
influence of behavior.  Many Europeans became Nazi sympathizers out of utter fear 
that nonconformity would lead to imprisonment or death.9  Parallels are often drawn 
                                                          
9 In contrast to this, many were seduced by the prospect of joining the Nazi definition of the 
Volksgemeinschaft.  The Nazis did not view the members of their “master race” as necessarily 
having been only German, rather Nordic or Germanic.  The Waffen SS recruited members from 
all over Europe initially including volunteers from Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
and Finland. 
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between George Orwell‟s 1984, and aspects of Nazi Germany, both societies whose 
citizens led lives with order and ambiguity fueled by the fear and uncertainty that any 
deviation from the given norm would result in unwanted attention, culminating in some 
form of interrogation or punishment.  In Nazi Germany it was the responsibility of police 
elements to penetrate into every aspect of public and private life secretly, and publicly 
to create a legend of terror designed to make them appear even more omniscient 
and ubiquitous than they were (Crankshaw 89).      
A well constructed control system which manipulates situational forces is able to 
manufacture culture.  The new perceptions resulting from the adoption of the culture 
are available at the group level as well as the individual level.  The intoxicating feeling 
brought about by nationalism is created at the group level.  Nationalism itself is a 
perception, an intoxicating feeling of being able to identify oneself as part of a society 
on the state level.  The intoxication is created by the influence of commonality, 
commonality within culture, language, economy, intelligence, origin, political entities, 
etc.  Still too, it is directly influenced by a system of governing, the centralization of 
which provides for stronger identification amongst perceived realities that exist within 
the individual.  Recognizing national pride drives him or her towards a nationally 
common goal, whether it is orchestrated by a common national identity or systemic 
influence.  The Nazis indeed sought to create a national community exclusive to those 
they deemed Aryan.  Their brand of “official nationalism” would prevail as the Nazis 
expanded their influence into territories east of Germany proper (Anderson 95).  For the 
Nazis it was not just any nationalism, but ethnic nationalism.  In other words, a 
nationalism founded in blood, which included only Aryans.  The ethno-nationalistic aims 
of the Nazi regime would create a subordinate periphery in their conquered eastern 
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territories as the Slavs which came under their control were selectively relocated and or 
killed in order to provide the Lebensraum so desperately sought by the Nazis.  Ethnic 
nationalism‟s reliance on racism creates a dichotomous in-group/out-group relationship 
through the othering of subordinated groups.  As a direct consequence of this 
relationship, an individual becomes no longer identifiable as such, but rather as part of 
his or her group or nation.  This weakens individual perceptibility of wrong-doing and 
strengthens the culture.  These so called lesser peoples are subsequently othered into a 
less than human status, making the decision to pull the trigger a relatively easier one.   
Once the culture is created, it is left up to the individual as to how far he or she 
will follow the group into higher levels of intoxication.  The anonymity brought about by 
this acceptance provides the individual with a sense of detachment from his or her 
actions.  The affected group is capable of committing acts that might not have been 
perceptible within the accepted norms of, in the case of Nazi Germany, Western 
society.10  Forces such as deindividuation occur on the individual level.  When 
committing an act of slaughter, police units acting as a group created a sense of 
anonymity for the individual.  The individuals, despite this feeling of anonymity, act 
alone to murder victims with whom they feel no personal bond.  Varying levels of 
acceptance of new moral standards were experienced by different categories of 
society.  The general populace and the regular armed forces were not as malleable as 
SS and other police units, and thus, on a relative scale, experienced a lower level of 
intoxication. 
The transition into and acceptance of a new culture, as well as the effects of 
situational forces are eased by a feeling of detachment created by the concept of 
                                                          
10 The word “Western” should be interpreted very loosely here.  It is meant merely to distinguish 
European, American, and Eurasian norms from East-Asian, other Asian, and African norms. 
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what Robert Lifton calls “doubling.”  During the process of doubling the self is essentially 
split into two selves.  One self remains loyal to ordinarily humane moral standards while 
the other, “killing self,” is created in order to facilitate one‟s personal survival in an 
environment of death and “dirty work” (Lifton 219).  This theory suggests that members 
of Nazi culture were able to create a self capable of inhuman acts, yet feel detached 
from those acts and an absence of any responsibility, even though they were 
responsible, because their good self was incapable of ugly deeds.  Unfortunately, the 
obligations associated with accepting Nazi culture forced the killing self to take over 
the dominant role.                
In order to better understand the principle of doubling, which is brought about 
by the transitioning into a new culture, consider the analogy of the movie actor.  An 
actor or actress who assumes a role in a film obviously has their own life to go home to 
every day.  However, in order to be considered a good actor, they must possess the 
ability to close off their minds to their own lives and assume the life of another in what 
one would consider an alternate set of cultural beliefs.  They must then exist in this 
culture for the duration of their work.  Everyone who has ever read a book or watched 
a movie and been emotionally touched thereby experiences a similar effect.  It is 
commonly referred to as “identifying with a character.”  They assume this role and 
become the actor in their own mind.  The point is that ordinary people go to a movie 
theater to escape the difficulties of their daily lives.  Imagining one‟s own existence 
within the movie itself is synonymous with experiencing a different set of emotional 
responses resulting from the overarching culture.  Upon leaving the theater, a movie 
which was particularly moving does not leave one‟s mind immediately, one thinks 
about it, imagines what one would have done differently, and perhaps goes even 
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further in living out this alternate life within one‟s own mind.  Therefore a successful 
systemic influence creates that second part, a lasting change of cultural and moral 
values within the mind of the individual beyond the point when they are directly 
propagated.  Consequently it is evident that a culture‟s values can be perceived on an 
individual basis and personal feelings and manifestations thereof are brought about 
once a culture is accepted.  Moreover, the fact that entire groups within society do 
experience its ongoing effects similarly only strengthened the culture.  The group 
consensus that this culture is acceptable means that questioning its existence is more 
difficult, because it is what everyone is experiencing, rather than just oneself.    
The adoption of religious or political ideals happens in a similar fashion.  A child 
who is baptized into a particular religion is not born believing in the ideals of that 
religion; rather these ideals are learned through a process of indoctrination.  Each 
successful case then occurs when that child leaves worship continuing to believe in 
that set of ideals even when the administrator thereof is not present to advocate this 
particular set of beliefs.  The child has thus stepped into a role within a specific culture.   
Strong pillars of fear and authority allow for the entrenchment of systems 
capable of manipulating culturally accepted norms and therefore the actions of their 
subordinates.  Behind the shroud of the resulting unreality, the actions of ordinary men 
and women are altered from what a person outside of the controlled culture would 
expect to see exhibited.  Having outlined the broader concept of systemic structure 
and influence, the Nazi culture will now be examined as it affected the three aspects of 
society which contributed to the murderous program: the German people as a whole, 
the leadership, and the police units in the East.  Much of Germany was influenced by 
an overwhelming presence of economic, political, and social hardship, through which 
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they struggled for years.  Their unique history caused them to be gradually consumed 
by the desire for national greatness.  Eventually they would come to deindividuate 
those who had once been their neighbors.  The leadership sought to maintain their hold 
on power and push through their ideological values no matter the consequences.  
Hitler‟s ideology caused him to make a series of rash military decisions which would cost 
Germany the war, while Himmler used his mundane skills to manufacture genocide.  
The Nazi police units were the perpetrators of mass-murder.  They dehumanized their 
enemies and murdered them mercilessly, employing what had been ordered by the 
system without question. 
The goal of this study is to analyze the mentalities of groups and individuals 
based on their everyday lives under a restrictive government.  Analyzing the different 
levels of society relieves some of the ambiguity that comes with implying such broad 
theories.  The study will show how each level of Nazi society effectively embraced, to 
varying degrees, the objectives of their leaders, and how the leadership was able to 
accomplish this.  
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Germany and the Populace 
Perhaps one of the earliest anomalies that led to the NSDAP‟s rise in Germany 
and the subsequent campaigns of war and mass murder is the concept of the German 
Sonderweg.11  The term Sonderweg, although it originated much earlier, came again to 
the forefront of German historiography in West Germany following World War II, as the 
Germans sought their true identity.  It is intended to define how Germany during the 19th 
and early 20th centuries deviated from the norm.12  Germany, on the other hand, was 
neither here nor there.  Germany, first of all, did not exist until 1871.  Germany was 
somewhere between the autocratic Russian Empire and the capitalist democracies of 
the United States and Britain.  The Germans of the time remained the most widely 
educated people in the world (Lukacs 45).  Many states within what would become 
Germany had their own university amounting to several dozen in total; they had to, in 
order to train doctors and lawyers.  Britain, by comparison, had two.  Despite this 
emphasis on an advanced culture, industrialization came rather late.   
 Aside from the reasons given above, there were two relatively intertwined 
themes that created a Sonderweg for Germany in its history.  The first one is the 
repeated failure of both revolution and democracy.  Prussian and other leaders during 
the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century were able to anticipate the 
call for reforms, therefore weakening resentment towards absolutism in view of what 
they were to portray as enlightened absolutism.  This created a unique trust in the 
                                                          
11 Separate path.  There is no perfect translation to explain the exact meaning of this word, 
though it should be made clear by the context.   
12 The norm was considered to be both Britain and the United States and, to a lesser degree, 
France.  It‟s no coincidence that this insinuation gained much life prior to the war considering 
that the United States and Britain occupied Western Germany for a time.  The justification 
therefore is that both examples of normality were unified, industrialized, capitalist nations with a 
strong middle class ruled by an elected body.   
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monarchies that did not implement enlightened policies, contrary to revolutionary 
tendencies in the soon to be United States or in France, whose ruler, in the case of the 
latter, did not offer any concessions to a vastly expanding bourgeoisie in the midst of 
the Enlightenment.   
 The second, and perhaps more vital theme, was the renewed concentration on 
German culture, leading to the creation of a Bildungsbürgertum.13  Because of their 
relative appeasement, in the way of the aforementioned policies of enlightened 
absolutism after attempted revolutions during the mid-nineteenth century, many 
intellectuals and thinkers became disinterested in government, digressing to the point 
into which they became apolitical.  This retreat from the “mechanical” ponderings of 
society to the “organic” ones, along with the political sphere being dominated by the 
elite, contributed to the success of the Nazis (Blackbourn & Eley 161).  Many intellectuals 
in the 1930s did not support the Nazis, but by no means were they against them.  Many 
of those doctors, lawyers, and engineers who were interested in politics joined the Nazi 
party.14  Many of the subjects associated with the word Bildungsbürgertum fell under 
the implication that the well educated part of society did not use their education in a 
mechanical or political manner and merely watched events unfold rather than acting 
in one way or the other.   
 It is no coincidence that the apolitical mindset of many German people in the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century coincides with what is to be expected 
by a military person.  When such high levels of apathy exist, human nature suggests that 
one simply will follow along with what others suggest.  Likewise, an officer or soldier who 
                                                          
13 The word Bildungsbürgertum can be translated simply as “educated middle class.”   
14
 Almost every member of the failed 1923 Putsch commemorated by Hitler in Mein Kampf 
belonged to one of these groups. 
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swears allegiance, in so doing, agrees not to be affiliated with a certain political party.  
The same was true in Nazi Germany.  There are few exceptions, but in most cases even 
high ranking generals were not part of the Nazi party (Wette 151).   
 The unique mindset of the German populace leading up to and during 
the rise of the National Socialist German Workers‟ Party (NSDAP) was compounded by 
the hardship they would experience during and following World War I.  The weaknesses 
the structure of the Weimar Republic, which did not allow it to overcome the cries for 
fast results promised by extremist parties during time of hardship.  These weaknesses 
combined with a strong feeling of nationalism to lead to the breakdown of democracy. 
Towards the end of WWI, the British blockade of German ports was taking a 
severe toll on food rations and unrest continued to grow.  The German populace 
began to undergo social and economic hardship which will never be forgotten.  Thus 
from this point on, the first situational force is created.  Despite this, the news that 
Germany had signed the Armistice while their armies still occupied parts of Belgium and 
France left them with the frame of mind that they had not lost the war, but rather had 
been betrayed by their leaders who had abdicated power (Willmott 289).  Thus the 
myth of the Dolchstoß, or “the stab in the back,” was born, of which Adolf Hitler would 
be a major beneficiary (289).  Hitler made certain that the misperception of Jews, 
Bolsheviks, and Socialists having contributed to the fiasco was reinforced.   
After its defeat in WWI, Germany fell into a state of total disarray nearly 
culminating in revolution, introducing political hardship in addition to economic and 
social.  After the Kaiser fled the unrest in Berlin, power was given to the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), which was charged with creating a new civilian government 
(Fulbrook 25).  The SPD enlisted the aid of the military and various units of the Freikorps 
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(demobilized soldiers funded by the private sector) which violently suppressed a major 
coup attempt by the far-left (28).  Seen here is the continuance of an in-group/out-
group relationship, the fear of Bolshevism and communism which the Nazis would 
ultimately exploit.  The constitution of the Weimar Republic, which would soon take 
effect, gave the President and head of state incredible personal power.  He had the 
ability to appoint and dismiss Chancellors at will, dissolve the parliament and call new 
elections, and, in the case that the parliament could not negotiate a majority, 
authorize the Chancellor to rule by presidential decree (29).  Considering the relative 
power of the president, it is remarkable that the democracy lasted as long as it did.  In 
view of this, it is important to note that Friedrich Ebert, the initial presidential appointee, 
used his power to promote and stabilize democracy.  Because of the limited success of 
the Weimar Republic in stabilizing the regime, there was a lack of identification 
stemming from the populace (Kocka 66).   
The situation went from bad to worse.  The Belgians and French, who were 
dissatisfied with the German production of reparation goods, sent a force of 100,000 
men (equal to that of the entire German Army, which was limited to such a number as 
a condition of the Treaty of Versailles) to the Ruhr region.  The subsequent boycott by 
the Germans to work under occupation compounded the economic situation in the 
rest of the country, ultimately leading to a period of hyper-inflation during 1923.  The 
nationalistic attitude of the German populace led to this refusal to work, worsening their 
situation.  By November 15, 1923, the US Dollar was worth approximately 4.2 trillion 
marks, an unfathomable number, creating an impossible situation for the average 
person whose savings had been wiped away (Fulbrook 34).  Alongside the eventual 
termination of the policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr a new form of currency was 
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introduced, easing the pressure on the economy but not serving to resolve the problem 
entirely.  Clearly the conditions of reparation imposed by the Treaty of Versailles were 
too severe and would need to be renegotiated. 
The political and economic events beginning in 1917 until noticeable stabilization 
in the mid 1920s are significant because, as previously mentioned, they laid the ground 
work for hardship and nationalism (manifesting out of resentment; resentment for the 
Treaty of Versailles, the loss of WWI, the Weimar Republic, occupation of the Ruhr, etc.) 
which would later be exploited to the fullest by the Nazis.  Once the U.S. Stock Market 
crashed in 1929 and American loans ceased nearly all aspects of German society 
collapsed once again.  Voters who remembered their recent suffering were drawn to 
the promises and extreme proposals bestowed by a wonderfully charismatic speaker, 
Adolf Hitler.  Ebert‟s successor, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, an ageing military 
hero and old elite seeking to reinstate such rule, was considerably less committed to 
upholding democratic rule (Kershaw 107).  Ironically, he helped to pave the road for 
Hitler, someone who did not wish to see a return to monarchy, to eventually rise to 
power (106).  This was able to occur because of the out-group sentiment created early 
on by the SDP.  Hitler was obviously not the ideal choice for the old elites, he was rather 
what they viewed at the time as a lesser of two evils.  Attempts by the old elite to 
control Hitler having failed, and fearing a communist takeover, they had no choice but 
to convince Hindenburg to appoint Hitler Chancellor in 1933.  This was an enormously 
significant event for the sake of the Nazi system, because it presented a perception of 
legitimacy to the German people, a perception, because the last free elections held in 
1933 were indeed less than free (Fulbrook 67).  The Reichstag fire of February 27 
condoned mass arrests of communists and social democrats, creating a daunting 
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environment for voters (67).  The Sturmabteilung (SA), essentially the Nazi private army, 
was a powerful instrument of, among other things, fear, and was largely responsible for 
creating this “environment.”  Their uniforms, flags, and songs were an inspiration for 
nationalistic tendencies.  Their aggression towards opposition groups, at times bordering 
upon civil war, set the tone for Nazi expectations.   
After the Reichstag was burned, Hitler finally achieved the two-thirds majority 
vote that he required to pass his Ermächtigungsgesetz (Enabling Law) restricting civil 
liberties and effectively ending democracy (68).  The Catholics were promised that their 
religious livelihoods would remain relatively untouched in future years by Hitler‟s signing 
of the Reichskonkordat of 1933 with Pope Pius XI.  Alongside other central parties, 
whose belief was that they could moderate a Nazi controlled government, the 
Catholics voted for the law, while only the Social Democrats chose to vote against it 
(Koonz 273).  Some Social Democrats and all Communists were prevented from joining 
the session.     
Despite the Nazi suggestion of a Machtergreifung (seizure of power), Hitler did 
seemingly legalize his authority, thus legitimizing his hold on the country (Bracher 97).  
Even though he turned Germany into a dictatorship, he dismantled the constitution 
through a vote in the Reichstag.  Over the next year or so, Hitler implemented his policy 
of Gleichschaltung, literally meaning “same gear,” as a means of consolidating his rule.  
In 1934, following the death of Hindenburg, Hitler took the liberty of merging the offices 
of Chancellor and President for himself, subsequently assuming the title of Führer.  With 
this first pillar, that of authority, in place, he needed to make sure to strengthen the rest 
of his systemic support structure. 
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Once the NSDAP became a respectable political power, however, the SA 
developed into more or less a liability rather than an asset.  The Schutzstaffel (protection 
squad or SS), who had assumed the role of Hitler‟s bodyguard and was made up 
typically of well educated and somewhat affluent men, as well as the Army, soon felt 
threatened by the existence of the lower class band of troublemakers who made up 
the SA.  Hitler knew the support of the former two groups was more important and thus 
subsequently ordered a liquidation of the SA leadership which would occur during the 
“Night of Long Knives” (71).  The SA was soon thereafter integrated into the regular 
army.  The SS, who at their height would number five million, had many branches 
incorporated into them, including the Geheime Staatspolizei (“secret state police” or 
Gestapo) (Crankshaw 16).  Once Heinrich Himmler was officially appointed the Head of 
the German Police in 1936, he quickly merged the Gestapo, which would adopt the 
role of the regime‟s instrument of terror, into the SS (90).  The Secret State Police, as their 
name suggests, were able to create an aura of fear that kept any questioning of the 
decisions of the regime in check.15  Herein lays the second pillar: fear of one‟s 
government silences the majority of voices, therefore leading to an increased 
unlikelihood for rebellious thought and talk.  The Gestapo were given sole power to 
place people in “protective custody” which meant sending them to concentration 
camps, as well as the power to “rearrest” anyone who had already been tried and 
released by the courts, a power which effectively placed them above the law (114). 
                                                          
15 A classic literary example of this is portrayed in Bertolt Brecht‟s work The Informer.   The main 
characters, whose seemingly innocuous comments against Hitler and members of his system of 
control, are incredibly stricken by fear once they notice that their son, a member of the Hitler 
Youth, has suddenly left the house.  They fear that he has gone to report what they‟ve said to his 
instructors and that they will soon be arrested.  In actuality, their son had merely gone to buy 
candy and their fears were ultimately produced by the atmosphere of paranoia and 
uncertainty, which one might assume has been created by the Gestapo. 
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In order to exert external control of the populace, the Nazis needed a body such 
as the SS.   Hitler, as the figure head, also fit perfectly into the mold which made 
complete repression near possible, where the fearful remained so, and those with a 
desire to speak out were hidden away from public view (Wolff 42).  The classic example 
of this level of total repression is in George Orwell‟s 1984, in which all are slaves – the 
proles, the outer, and the inner party members (42).  Regardless of the extent to which 
the populace buys into the systemically manufactured culture, individual escape, and 
group collaboration against the regime become impossible.  The figure of Big Brother is 
something to idealize, an icon, a hero, a god to look up to and obey.  Hitler‟s talent for 
public speaking made him such an entity.  The depiction of Hitler as such a figure stems 
yet from the ideology of the Nazis themselves.   
The Nazi ideology can be summarized in three key points.  The Nazis sought to 
defeat what they deemed an infestation of “international Jewry,” which in their eyes 
had infiltrated every part of society, by exterminating those people they 
acknowledged as “less than human” (Fulbrook 52).  The second objective for the Nazis 
was to defend the world against the “onslaught” of Bolshevism from the East (Kocka 
67).  The dichotomy in respect which later existed between Hitler and Stalin is 
interesting.  Hitler, whose ideological goals had beseeched him to attack the Soviet 
Union from the very beginning as well as his contempt for Stalin and Slavic peoples in 
general, were in stark contrast to Stalin‟s perplexing respect for Hitler and the German 
people (Lukacs 55).  By June of 1941 Hitler wanted a war with Stalin no matter what, he 
did not present Stalin with demands because he feared that they might be accepted, 
while at the same time Stalin did not believe that Hitler would attack him and refused to 
accept this reality, even days after the fact (4).  The final aspect of Nazi ideology, and 
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that most relevant to the creation of a new culture, was the aim to create a 
Volksgemeinschaft (national community).  This national community would be devoid of 
traditional class structure and be “pure” of “inferior” races and degenerates (Fulbrook 
52).  Also encompassed by the idea of this community was the need for the creation of 
Lebensraum (living space) for the German peoples which would not come from the 
acquisition of colonies abroad, but rather by expanding to the east, requiring war with 
the Soviet Union to achieve mastery in Europe as well as the subsequent elimination of 
the inhabitants of these lands.  The economic and nationalistic goals envisioned by 
Hitler became appealing to a wide range of social groups holding differing 
resentments, yet all suffering under the same economic depression, precisely because 
he was ambiguous as to the details of the new economic order (Falter 93).  Hitler‟s rise 
as an icon was fueled by the sensation surrounding the creation of a national 
community spurned by the scapegoating of what the Nazis deemed “subversive” 
groups.  Remembering the hardship and embarrassment of the years during and 
following World War I, the idea of strong leader for this proud group of people was very 
alluring (Moeller 8). 
The first facet of Nazi ideology manages to dehumanize what Nazi laws would 
make into a very visible enemy.  The second and third create a sense of nationalism 
which inspires added intoxication within the moment.  The third part of Nazi ideology 
manages to further develop a perceived in-group vs. out-group struggle which had 
been stewing for decades. Systemic influencing of these situational forces began to 
create a new culture for both the general populace and the SS, the latter of which was 
already responsible for the mass-murder of millions of Jews and others, for which the 
systematic extermination of whom was a step further.  Die Endlösung, or Final Solution, 
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was enacted in January of 1942 at a secret conference in Wannsee.  Already Jews had 
been deported to concentration camps or confined to ghettos, but not until 1942 did 
the Nazis initiate perhaps the most horrifying atrocity the world has ever seen. 
In addition to the anti-Semitic propaganda produced by the Nazis, such as the 
release of Der ewige Jude, or The Eternal Jew (Appendix A), intended to “prepare” the 
population for the imminent extermination, the Nazis used a medley of linguistic tools in 
an effort to soften the realization that Jews were being aggressively targeted (Willmott, 
Cross, & Messenger 156).  The Nazi manipulation of the German language, both in 
creating new words as well as altering the meaning of existing ones, was so prevalent 
that such terminology is capable of being comprised within an entire lexicon.  The 
connotation of seemingly harmless words such as Umsiedlung (resettlement) is carried 
even today, so much so that German journalists are often provided with a list of such 
words that they should not use.  The verb reinigen, which can simply mean “to clean,” 
was used to refer to the “purification” of the German Volk.  The word Untermensch, 
which literally means “subhuman,” is a teaching term coming from the Nazi 
Rassenkunde and was used to refer to any racial or ethnic group that the Nazis 
determined to be “undesirable,” essentially anyone who was not of “Nordic” or 
“Germanic” descent, i.e. Aryan (Kammer & Bartsch 270).16  Thus the Nazis went to a 
great extent to prepare the German people, as they saw it, for the Final Solution, which 
they knew pushed all limits.  Yet new moral standards brought about by the prevailing 
acceptance of the Nazi culture and the agents of the system were enough to prevent 
the populace from denouncing these heinous acts.             
                                                          
16
 The study of race.  The German citizenry, notably the youth, was educated in what was 
deemed by the Nazis to be their superior racial status.   
26 
 
In his work Hitler in Ourselves Max Picard makes the statement: “. . . with the 
Germans, nothing counts that presently exists” (112).  His insinuation is that the Germans, 
as a people, are always dissatisfied with the present and long for a return to the past or 
the embracing of something new.  He goes on to suggest that in this vacuum of an 
undying desire for things past or things future occurs the inability to accept the future 
once it becomes present, thus creating a mindless cycle in which the “dictator‟s” orders 
become a desirable answer to those seemingly stuck in limbo on the outskirts of 
existence (113).  Of course this is a dramatically pessimistic, post-war view of one‟s own 
people.  A pervasive longing for the past, seemingly synonymous with a desire for the 
new, can be written off neither as an explanation for submission in it of itself nor as an 
exclusively German problem.  This is rather a Western desire in general.  One‟s present 
environment is almost never a satisfactory achievement; past fortune is desirable during 
strenuous and tumultuous times, and the future can appear both terrible and attractive.  
Picard also argues for the existence of a state of discontinuity, or a state of seeking 
momentary desires within Germany leading up to and during World War II, a state in 
which only statements of fact matter, and truth, a characteristic of permanence, is 
disregarded (102). 17  The absence of truth is synonymous with the failure to accept 
one‟s past.  The Germans during the 30‟s were willing to take on and acknowledge 
Hitler as their leader because they failed to accept the exactness of conditions in which 
they lost the First World War.  The presence of allied victory parades in German cities 
may have served to facilitate this acceptance, yet they did not occur and many 
Germans went on believing the myth that they had been stabbed in the back, a myth 
which was exploited to all ends by Hitler and the NSDAP.  These examples are meant to 
                                                          
17 This exists as an individual “disconnects” himself from the world at large in order to seek out 
desires that would be most advantageous both presently and temporarily. 
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illustrate Picard‟s insistence of a dichotomy between truth and fact spurred on by the 
state of discontinuity he claims existed within Germany.  Surely this suggestion offers 
contribution to the creation of newly acceptable cultural norms by the Nazis, but a less 
than desirable present cannot, as Picard seems to offer, be the only explanation to the 
horrors committed by the regime and its followers. 
The prevalence of apathy towards Hitler and his party in the early days, allowed 
situational forces to be built up and subsequently acted upon by the Nazis, creating an 
environment in which they would flourish. 18  Obviously the ascension of Hitler to the 
position of chancellor was never an absolute certainty, but rather the consummation of 
many factors.  The Allies imposed very strict reparations on Germany after World War I, 
who solely bore the blame.   In 1929 the U.S. Stock Market crashed, cutting off 
American money which had been helping to stabilize a fledgling democracy.  These 
coinciding factors contributed to the success of Hitler and the Nazis in creating new 
cultural norms amidst a realm of uncertainty and Verführbarkeit (seductability) within 
the German populace. 19  
                                                          
18 The political apathy attributed to German intellectuals prior to the rise of the NSDAP was a 
subject of popular culture following the war.  This attitude is embodied in the following statement 
by Martin Niemöller, a German theologian, “They came first for the Communists, 
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist.  Then they came for the trade unionists, 
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist.  Then they came for the Jews, and I 
didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for me and by that time no one was 
left to speak up” (Marcuse). 
19 The German word Verführbarkeit can be loosely translated to the notion of seductibility.  
Heinrich Heine‟s poem Lorelei is often interpreted as a metaphor to the seductiveness of 
nationalism.  Having written the poem before German unification in 1871, it foreshadowed the 
dangers of nationalism which contributed largely to Germany‟s entry into World War I.  During 
and after Hitler‟s rise to power, there was a renewed focus on the seductive powers of 
nationalism, a concept preached relentlessly by the NSDAP.  The Lorelei is a rock along the 
Rhine River at a particularly dangerous bend, atop of which, it was said, sat a beautiful maiden, 
combing her hair and singing a song.  The sailors down below were mesmerized by her beauty 
of both flesh and song, and ignored the dangers ahead leading to their demise.  The maiden, 
representing nationalism or Hitler in this context, mesmerizes the people of Germany which will 
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With the three pillars of their systemic support structure in place, Hitler‟s 
legitimized authority, fear of imprisonment, and identification with a strong leader, the 
Nazis were able to tighten repression and create a culture in which notorious deeds of 
inhumanity were acted out.  This solid structure of support thus served to cement the 
existence of the Nazi control system.  With their hold on power now secure, the regime 
was able to manipulate the pieces and individuals of the system at will and without any 
threat of destruction from within.  With the concurrent absence of any external threat, 
so dutifully provided by France and Britain‟s policy of appeasement, the Nazi system 
became impenetrable.  Just like the fictional existence of Oceania in Orwell‟s 1984 the 
system‟s only threat could now come from a coordinated uprising of the proles, or 
general populace, the unlikelihood of which is embodied in impossibility and little more 
than a fool‟s hope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ultimately lead them unto ruin.  Heinrich Heine was one of many whose works were burned by 
the Nazis at political rallies.     
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Hitler & Himmler 
Hitler‟s position as leader of the German Volk carries some uniqueness as far as 
the discussion of culture is concerned.  He experienced the same intoxicating feeling of 
nationalism and certainly underwent a period of hardship (Toland).  However, his 
eventual position of power led him away from the pressures of any superiors and 
strengthened his belief that he was meant to save Germany, leading to his fanatical 
implementation of Nazi ideology (Hitler).  The following section on Hitler focuses on 
those ideological stressors of Hitler‟s in-group vs. out-group stance which overshadowed 
nearly all of his decisions.    
From the beginning of Nazi control, Hitler‟s own ideological values left little doubt 
as to the question of war.  This included little doubt towards whether or not Nazi 
Germany would declare war on the Soviet Union despite the Non-Aggression Pact 
signed by the countries respective leaders.  In Hitler‟s view the war in the West was that 
between differing political ideologies, that of democracy and National Socialism 
(Toland).  Hitler held a great deal of respect for Winston Churchill and the resolve of the 
British people, whom he viewed as racial cousins, more of an obstacle on his way to 
victory, rather than what he considered to be an enemy pitted in an “eternal struggle” 
against the Aryan race (Hitler 124). 
Hitler‟s own ideological blindness forced him to ignore a multitude of threats in 
addition to an obvious path to victory.  He decided against knocking Britain out of the 
war and therefore any threat of American intervention, as a cross-Atlantic invasion in 
the face of a combined British-German fleet would have been nothing short of 
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impossibility (Alexander 47). 20  Perhaps more significantly, he chose not to supply Erwin 
Rommel with an ample amount of panzer divisions which would have quickly overrun 
the British in North Africa, subsequently allowing him to take Cairo and the Suez Canal, 
the latter of which the British were already in the process of abandoning as they feared 
a German onslaught (79).  His armies could have gone all the way to British colonial 
India, neutral Turkey would have been forced to allow for German troop transport, and 
German guns would have reached the Caucuses.  Had he heeded the advice of his 
level-headed generals he would have been able to both surround and defeat the 
Soviet Union through indirect means, rather than a head-on confrontation which was to 
ensure massive German casualties.  Even having ignored all of this, victory in a head-on 
invasion of the Soviet Union might still have been possible given either an April start, or, 
as alluded to earlier, a consolidated drive of all three army groups towards either 
Stalingrad and the territory south of there, which would have given the Germans 
access to an infinite amount of fuel and supplies, or Moscow, the Soviet capital and 
communication hub (83).   
These events were obviously not the course that history has taken.  Hitler, already 
displeased that an invasion of the Soviet Union had not taken place before 1941, as 
well as his ideologically-driven insistence on taking all three objectives immediately, 
ensured that the advice and requests of military minds such as Rommel, Heinz 
Guderian, and Erich von Manstein (considered by many to have been not only the best 
                                                          
20 In this section, one will notice frequent reference to Bevin Alexander‟s work: How Hitler Could 
Have Won WWII: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat. The reason for this is Alexander‟s 
expertise in military history, as well as the theoretical nature of this particular work.  This section is 
intended to supplement understanding of the overlying ideological attitude.  
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German strategists, but the best of the war) fell on deaf ears. 21  Hitler, in response to an 
expanding delusion of grandeur in his own mind (another symptom of his), instead saw 
himself as the true military genius, a fact emboldened by his coincidental support of 
Manstein‟s earlier strategy to invade France through the Ardennes in addition to the 
obvious route through Belgium, thus avoiding almost entirely the tribulations of coming 
up against the Maginot Line (Bullock 393).  This, coupled with the reassurance of 
adulators such as Wilhelm Keitel and Hermann Göring, gave Hitler no reason to believe 
that the impractical goal of capturing each objective in the East could be achieved in 
little time (Alexander 80).  Therefore, the phrase “turning point of the war,” commonly 
associated with the Sixth Army‟s collapse and successive surrender in Stalingrad, is 
correct, though Stalingrad is neither where the war was lost by Germany, nor where it 
should have been.  In all likelihood the war was not necessarily lost as much as a 
German victory had become impossible once the order was given to commence 
Operation Barbarossa.  The war was lost due to Hitler‟s no-retreat policy,  a policy which 
                                                          
21
 The first objective was Leningrad in the North, due to its ideological value to the Soviets as the 
birthplace of Bolshevism.  Leningrad was logistically the most attainable of the three objectives 
laid out by Hitler because of its relative location to the Baltic Sea and Finland, a German ally.  
The Finns however, having allied themselves with Hitler more or less out of necessity, were only 
interested in reestablishing their pre-war border with the Soviets, which had been pushed back in 
1939, and never intended to commit themselves in full contribution to Hitler‟s end war against 
the Soviets.  For that reason, Finland represented only a logistical advantage to Germany and 
offered no real aid in terms of personnel once the Germans crossed the pre-war boundary.  The 
second objective was Moscow, which is obvious as it was the Soviet capital.  The third objective 
was the oil fields to the south of Stalingrad, which would have provided the Germans with an 
infinite supply of fuel.  The fact that Hitler had the sense to declare this last objective suggests 
that he had some sense about him militarily, yet the fact that he felt the simultaneous 
completion of these objectives was possible due to his view of the respective fighting qualities of 
the Aryan and the Slav would seemingly cancel out this assertion.  As a direct consequence of 
this view, none of the three objectives were completed in their entirety.  Leningrad was 
surrounded and besieged, but never captured.  German advance units came within sight of 
Moscow before being permanently turned away.  Hitler gave up the Wehrmacht‟s tactical 
advantage by ordering the Sixth Army to capture Stalingrad instead of encircling it, thus the 
Soviets won a war of attrition here in which they held the overwhelming advantage, and thus 
the Germans were never able to establish a significant hold to the respective south amongst the 
oil fields in the Caucuses.         
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he had decreed after the initial success of the German forces in the summer of 1941 
(Bullock 418).  He claimed that he would create “a Garden of Eden” in the East, and 
would take all necessary measures to see this happen (Browning 10).  As anyone with 
even an elementary understanding of military strategy knows, tactical withdrawals are 
often a necessity.  Instead the conflict became a war of attrition heavily favoring the 
Soviets, who held the luxury of being able to call upon millions more men. 
The upper echelon‟s terms of acceptance of new cultural norms are, in many 
cases, unique from that of the general populace.  The other Nazi leader worth 
examining is Heinrich Himmler, who would become head of the SS and essentially 
second in command of the Reich.  He organized the reign of terror perpetrated by his 
police forces as well as the implementation of the Final Solution.  Hitler was strongly 
attached to his actions and was seemingly not plagued by questions of morality 
(Bullock 469).  Himmler, in contrast, represents perhaps the most undeniably frightening, 
historical example of evil manifesting from an ordinary, boring person who was able to 
reach a very high level of authority.  The claim that Himmler was a normal man turned 
evil, as opposed to Hitler who was driven from early on by ideological values, warrants 
a brief look at his childhood and personal life.   
Born into a middle-class, Catholic family in Munich, Himmler was the middle child 
between two other brothers with whom he would share his parents‟ affection.  From an 
early age he became obsessed with the idea of ancestry.  He spent many hours in 
what he would later incorrectly refer to as the Ahnenzimmer, or ancestry room, a kind of 
shrine built in his parent‟s home to honor their ancestors (Frischauer 16).  This obsession 
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with ancestry later would lead to his establishment of a requirement to prove Aryan 
heritage back to 1750 in order to be admitted to the SS. 22 
Like many young men of the time, filled with nationalistic pride in the new 
Germany, Heinrich and his older brother Gebhard were intrigued by the prospects of 
World War I, and at first saw war training as more of a game rather than anything 
military (Himmler 51).  By 1917 Gebhard finished his schooling and was old enough to be 
called up into officer training and sent to the front.  Heinrich was able to convince his 
father, a school official, to let him leave school early to go to officer training.  The war 
ended before Heinrich finished his training.  For Himmler, the lack of any opportunity for 
him to prove himself in battle was a massive disappointment which remained with him 
as a stigma for the rest of his life, not only was he forced to renounce his dream of 
becoming an officer, but he did not possess a certificate of completion from school 
(60).  An interpretation of Heinrich‟s diary by his grand-niece makes clear the mix of 
admiration and envy he held for his older brother, and is an indication of the sibling 
rivalry which would help spur him to the head of the SS (61).   
 Himmler‟s nationalistic pride inspired him to join the Freikorps unit commanded 
by Ernst Röhm in 1919.  Years later he was appointed chief of police, a relatively 
insignificant position (141).  Over a short period of time he made his way to what would 
become his highest appointment of Reichsführer-SS, a small organization at the time, 
but through determination and excellent organization he was able to expand the 
group to over 50,000 members by 1933, and to millions by the time the war was over.  
                                                          
22 Ironically something that Himmler was never able to prove despite the wartime dedication of 
an entire staff.  I.e., he (and Hitler) would have not been admitted into the SS based on his own 
stipulations.   
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He adored Hitler, the leader of the Volk with whom he sought identification, and was 
heavily influenced by Hitler (Frischauer 23).    
The new cultural norms and moral boundaries experienced by Himmler make 
him the epitome of many SS officers and men.  Though he was not born a fanatic, his 
racially driven obsession with ancestry and the elimination of “lesser peoples” eased his 
transition in Hitler‟s world (120).  The fact that Himmler was able to escape Nazi culture 
by betraying Hitler in lieu of impending defeat, and subsequently attempt to flee the 
allies because of his murderous actions proves a certain level of banality (Toland 895).  
Once the acceptance of Nazi culture faded, Himmler was able to recognize the 
wrongness of his actions (those outside of the Nazi culture were always capable of this 
recognition) and cowardly attempted to flee.  Himmler, evidenced by his confession to 
his personal masseur, Felix Kersten, that he always kept with him a copy of the 
Bhagavad Gita because it relieved him of guilt about implementing the Final Solution, 
felt that he was simply “doing his duty” without attachment to his actions (Padfield 
402).23  This level of detachment represents the difference between true believers like 
Hitler and those who were drawn in, to differing degrees, by situational forces such as 
Himmler.     
 Once having assumed power, Hitler ultimately lived within his own mind, oblivious 
to the truths around him.  His ideological values ran his decision making.  The case of 
Himmler was akin to the epitome of what many Nazi underlings experienced.  But, 
Himmler was among the architects of the Holocaust and the acts of atrocity in the East, 
                                                          
23
 The Bhagavad Gita, or Gita, is a sacred Hindu scripture, the content of which consists of the 
conversation between Lord Krishna and Arjuna taking place on the battlefield before the start of 
the Kurukshetra War. Responding to Arjuna's confusion and moral dilemma about fighting his 
own cousins, Lord Krishna explains to Arjuna his duties as a warrior and prince.  The parallel is the 
obligation towards duty and the insinuation that moral dilemmas do not exist, there is no right or 
wrong, there is simply what must be done. 
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and was largely responsible for implementing Hitler‟s racial policies.  While some of the 
populace chose to look the other way and did nothing to prevent these acts of horror, 
Hitler had Himmler and other agents to aid him directly in his murderous plans.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Hitler’s Agents 
Hitler needed men as fanatically driven as he was in order for his racial policies to 
become part of Nazi culture.  Though the Wehrmacht was kept separate from political 
policies he had the perfect set of agents within Himmler‟s SS. 
As Hitler made his decision to invade the Soviet Union, he might not have 
realized what a daunting task his ideological drive had laid before him.  The sheer size 
alone of Eurasia meant it represented an abundance of Nazi enemies, yet also 
represented a logistical nightmare for any military planner.  The roads of the Soviet 
Union were quite primitive relative to the rest of Europe, and the difficulties of moving 
mass numbers of troops and armored vehicles were only compounded by the, 
Rasputitsa, the onset of months of rainy weather, which turned the roads into mud.  
Hitler‟s insistence on a military campaign against the Soviet Union, as soon as possible, 
and in so doing a simultaneous advance on the cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, and 
Moscow, forced his generals into ignoring the fact that a June start would ensure that 
they would not be able to reach Moscow by the time the rains and the subsequent 
winter set in.  As was the fate of Napoleon and his Grande Armée, the Wehrmacht was 
not properly equipped for the harsh Russian winter and paid dearly for such a 
grotesque miscalculation.   
Upon the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, four Einsatzgruppen would 
follow the Wehrmacht into Soviet controlled territory. 24  This was not the first time that 
Einsatzgruppen would be used.  They were deployed in Austria and Czechoslovakia 
                                                          
24 Literally meaning task force(s), these special paramilitary units were created and organized by 
the SS (though at times during Operation Barbarossa they were forced under military jurisdiction).  
The composition as well as the responsibilities of these task forces differed depending on the 
theater of conflict to which they were deployed.  In the East they consisted of not only personnel 
from the SS proper but also of various reserve police units and local volunteers (Langerbein 26).  
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prior to the war, Poland, as well as in the West.  In Austria and the West, the 
Einsatzgruppen were tasked with securing government offices and documents and 
were given lists of names of persons to be arrested immediately (Langerbein 25).  
Likewise there were several units given similar orders upon a successful invasion of 
Britain.  Those units following in the wake of the Wehrmacht in the East were tasked with 
a much different responsibility.  On paper, the Einsatzgruppen in the East were placed 
under military jurisdiction by Reinhard Heydrich, who was head of the Gestapo and 
other federal police units, as well as the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (26). 25    
In Poland the mission had been to eliminate the Polish Intelligentsia, armed (a 
term that was used very loosely) rebels, and communists.  The idea was to eliminate any 
sense of a Polish nation.  They arrested all aspects of the Polish elite, Communists, 
nationalists, Catholic priests, and Jews.  The stipulations of the campaign were summed 
up in Heydrich‟s own words, “We want to spare the little people, but the nobility, the 
priests and the Jews must be killed” (25).   
The four Einsatzgruppen following the Wehrmacht into the Soviet Union were 
given a similar mission.  Orders for execution were given for all functionaries of the 
Comintern, central party committees, regional and local committees, peoples 
commissaries, Jews in the Soviet party and state positions, and other radical elements 
such as saboteurs, propagandists and partisans. 26  The term “partisan” carried a very 
loose definition, left up to discretion.  Stalin‟s decree for partisan warfare provided a 
useful cover for the extermination of the Jews and other peoples deemed “racially 
                                                          
25 The security service was an elite branch of the SS and generally consisted of very well-
educated members who had also undergone a series of modes of indoctrination and were 
obligated to prove Aryan ancestry back to 1750 ( Langerbein 21). 
26 Comintern is an abbreviation for the Communist International, also known as the Third 
International.  It represented an international communist organization founded in Moscow in 
1919. 
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inferior” by the administration, such as the disabled, Gypsies, Mongols, Armenians, and 
Muslims, as well as, in Hitler‟s words, “. . . anyone who looks askew at us (Browning 10).  
As many as one to 2.5 million persons, mostly Jews, were murdered by the 
Einsatzgruppen and their local volunteers. 
In order for the Nazis to create a Lebensraum in the East, they had to remove the 
Jews, a process made easier by several “favorable” conditions (Langerbein 34).  The 
Jews in the Western portion of the Soviet Union were highly concentrated due to a 
mandate established by Catherine the Great all the way back in 1791 limiting their 
movement (34).  Because of their concentration here, as well as their perceived 
participation in the Bolshevik Revolution, there was already a high level of anti-Semitism 
waiting to be exploited by the Einsatzgruppen.  There existed a particular resentment 
amongst populations in the Ukraine, who had seen their independence movement 
crushed during the civil war, making it even easier for Einsatzgruppen units to initiate 
pogroms.  Another factor influencing the efficiency of the executions was the relative 
“ignorance” of the Jews (36).  Many of the Jews living in this area were alive or had 
relatives who were alive when the Germans came through during World War I.  Jewish 
culture was typically oriented towards Western Europe and Germany.  Many welcomed 
the arrival of the Germans who were members of a “Kulturnation” and would finally 
save them from Soviet barbarism (36).  The speed with which the Germans advanced 
through the western territories of the Soviet Union also proved to be a factor.  
Einsatzgruppen units operated directly behind units of the Wehrmacht and were often 
a welcomed addition because the army did not want to have to deal with the civilian 
population.  The Jews who soon realized that the tales of German atrocities were true 
attempted to flee but were often given up by their anti-Semitic neighbors or forced into 
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the wilderness.  The anti-Semitism fueled in-group/out-group dichotomy present already 
in these territories, created a horrible chance of survival for Nazi victims.   
The atrocities committed by the Einsatzgruppen in the East were among the 
worst of the war.  Hitler‟s strategic blunders, as earlier mentioned, prevented an even 
more massive extermination of Jews, et al. not only in Europe but in the rest of the world.  
The Nazi yearning to extend their ideological beliefs and system of control to other parts 
of the world is evidenced by the presence of an Einsatzgruppe in Greece as late as 
1942, which was awaiting deployment to the British mandate of Palestine (Satloff 23).  
They were tasked with enlisting support from the local Arab populations to kill the area‟s 
approximately half million Jews. 
For Hitler, the war in the East, in contrast to the previously mentioned war in the 
West, was a war of differing ethnicities.  Hitler and the Nazis held the Slavs in these 
territories to be of a lower class than they, and as a result the fighting was much more 
brutal as well as the casualty figures much greater (Yahil 319).  This was a war to decide 
the fate of the German Volk, and one which called upon the force of nationalism to 
enlist the help of ordinary people in an unordinary struggle.   
In the particular case of Nazi Germany, officers and men of the Wehrmacht 
swore obedience to Hitler, the figure, the Führer, rather than to Germany (Deist 173).  In 
his work, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson claims the existence of a 
“lemming-like level of sacrifice” amongst nationally recruited military personnel and 
inspired by nationalistic zeal (141). 27  For some, this level of dedication started as early 
as their childhood as members of the Hitlerjugend (HJ, Hitler Youth).  Such unbridled 
                                                          
27 The title of this work itself helps to illustrate the imaginativeness created by nationalistic fervor.  
Thus the insinuation here is that of an existence of an “imagined” realm inspired by nationalism 
as well as an actual one.  
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zeal would ensure that the war in the East was fought with an unprecedented level of 
brutality, matched perhaps only by the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria (Yahil 319).  
The peoples and the ideologies of the East represented everything that Hitler, and 
therefore the Nazis stood against (Hitler).  The Soviet Union in particular was looked 
upon as a scourge necessitating annihilation, and Hitler would stop at absolutely 
nothing to see this done through to the end.  The alliance between Germany and 
Japan was, for both, nothing more than a means to an end.  Japan sought first to assert 
its dominance upon Eastern Asia before initiating its final war with the Western races.  
Germany did not alert Japan of its plans to attack the Soviet Union, with whom Japan 
had recently signed a non-aggression pact.     
Members of the SS in particular received a higher level of indoctrination and 
obedience training than did other groups, and therefore experienced a much more 
evident forsaking of previously accepted moral standards (Lang 99).  Their religion was 
Hitler‟s racial dogma: blood and soil (Kammer & Bartsch 46).  They declared war on 
anyone who believed otherwise.  They were a political army who swore loyalty to Adolf 
Hitler the person, not the figure, as did the armed services. Likewise the SS and their 
auxiliary affiliates were responsible for the worst acts of inhumanity before and during 
the war.  Guidelines for SS members were expressed within the illustrated book The Path 
to Obedience, as requiring a quasi-religious devotion to the Führer, unconditional 
obedience, and continuing struggle and vigilance.  In fact, many Einsatzgruppen 
officers had firsthand experience with the negative impact of the earlier economic 
depression, therefore it is not surprising that the Nazi programs of fiscal revival attracted 
many of them to the SA and later SS even before Hitler came to power (Langerbein 
154).  Most SS men were of the middle-class nature, i.e. those who were most affected 
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by the economic depression.  They did not have jobs, and once having identified with 
Hitler and the Nazis, they quickly fell in line. 
Not trying to draw direct parallels between religion and nationalism, other than 
the fact that they both potentially condone an air of in-group/out-group relations, one 
of the most mysterious aspects of SS lore is Himmler‟s desire to establish a “center of the 
New World” at the castle Wewelsburg.  Wewelsburg is a Renaissance castle located in 
the German state of North-Rhine Westphalia.  Himmler sought a location with historical 
significance for his SS-leadership school (Hüser 9).  Himmler chose this particular location 
because he heard the legend of (among other various occult tales) the Schlacht am 
Birkenbaum (Battle of the Birch Tree) (2).  The legend tells of a future battle in which a 
massive force from the East is decisively beaten by the West, obviously an intriguing tale 
for any Nazi.  It is certain that he intended on creating a religion based education 
system and library for select SS officers and men.  Himmler wanted to replace general 
Christianity with a folk cult comparable to pre-Christian German paganism (2).  At the 
center of the SS-Generals‟ Hall lay the symbol of the Black Sun.  This symbol is often 
attributed to Nazi-mysticism and occult legends, but is also a common replacement for 
the Swastika in today‟s Neo-Nazi groups because, upon careful study, one notices that 
it consists of three Swastikas, or a sun-wheel and twelve “victory runes” (300).  The only 
documented meeting of SS Generals took place a week before Operation Barbarossa.  
Himmler apparently envisioned the castle as a meeting place for his own version of King 
Arthur‟s Knights of the Round Table, represented by the twelve rays extending from the 
Black sun (57).  Himmler ordered the castle to be destroyed in 1945 as the Americans 
closed in.  Though it was only partially destroyed, most of its mysteries died along with it.  
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No actual schooling ever took place at the castle, which was meant to be one 
of its primary functions.  However, the restoration of the castle itself, by SS funding, 
serves to illustrate just how far the most fanatical wing of Nazism was willing to go to 
educate future generations in their way of thinking.  In general, this particular aspect of 
Nazism, that being the SS, experienced, as mentioned earlier, new truths more 
disconnected from previous acceptance than did most other groups.  Most were 
capable of unparalleled acts of violence and horror.  The SS and its auxiliaries ran the 
concentration camps and the death camps, they made up the leadership of the 
Einsatzgruppen, and they showed unquestioned loyalty choosing death rather than 
surrender in many cases.  Even in the absence of immediate superiors, several thousand 
SS, Hitler Youth, and Volkssturm (home guard) units defended the Reichstag during the 
last days of the war to the point where only a few hundred finally surrendered and long 
after the Soviet flag had been raised atop the building (Willmott, Cross, and Messenger 
278).   
 In reference to the earlier comments on Himmler, the words “without 
attachment” represent perhaps the most significant effect felt by the perpetrators of 
mass-murder.  Without attachment carries a different connotation depending on the 
rank of the individual.  For someone like Himmler, as was the claim by many officers, he 
never did the shooting and therefore should not have been held accountable for 
murder.  Heading down the chain of command, the guards who did the shooting did 
not often bury or burn the bodies.  Those tasks were often left up to volunteers and, in 
extermination camps, selected able-bodied workers (Weiss).  Still too, at times the 
Einsatzgruppen units merely collected the Jewish inhabitants of villages in the East and 
transported them to the sites where they were to be shot.  They did not always do the 
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shooting themselves, leaving it up to the Hiwis, assuming they were sober enough to get 
the job done (Langerbein 39). 28  Alcohol was another influence of the term “without 
attachment,” especially for the local volunteers.  Even when the Einsatzgruppen units 
began to use gas vans in which the exhaust pipes were redirected into the rear of the 
trucks transporting victims, they simply drove around until the movement and 
screaming stopped, leaving it up to volunteers to empty out the bodies (39). 
 Continuing along the same line of thinking, the next factor which aided in the 
perpetration of these crimes is repetition or “routinization of the task” (Browning 159).  
I.e. repeatedly completing the same task over and over again, regardless of what it 
may be, makes it seem less complicated, less extreme.  Imagine the following analogy.  
A doctor in the intensive care unit of a hospital will overtime deal repeatedly with what 
is referred to as a train wreck code.29  A doctor‟s first real life experience with this type 
of emergency seems overwhelming, foreign, complicated.  However once the same 
doctor has handled dozens of these emergencies, the process becomes routine or 
relatively simple and each instance becomes forgettable.  Though this analogy might 
seem far removed from the context at hand, any task has the capacity of becoming 
routine, regardless of its extremity.  Only the initial instance is memorable, and unless the 
individual manages to break from the culture they are experiencing, the routinization of 
the task forces each subsequent instance to be removed from conscious regard. 
                                                          
28 Short for Hilfswillige (volunteers).  Because of the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Nazi-occupied 
territory in the East, it was not difficult for them to find volunteers willing to partake in the 
massacres.  However, they were often drunk and though their help when it came to the dirty 
work was most welcome, they sometimes shot each other or SS units accidentally amidst the 
crossfire.   
29 A train wreck code refers to an instance in which a patient is dying due to multiple 
complications that need to be resolved quickly. 
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One must remember that war time atrocities were not a monopoly of the Nazi 
regime, for with war undoubtedly comes atrocity.  The accounts of entire American 
units in the Pacific openly boasting of a “take no prisoners” policy and routinely 
collecting body parts of Japanese soldiers as battlefield souvenirs is a chilling reference 
to this fact (159).  War, especially race war, leads to brutalization and othering, which in 
turn lead to atrocity (159).  This othering is showcased by American propaganda during 
the war.  Disney propaganda videos targeting the Nazis consist merely of a degrading 
of their ideology and leadership (Appendix B).  Dissimilarly, anti-Japanese propaganda 
videos made by Disney target the Japanese themselves.  They consist of derogatory 
images depicting the Japanese as having monkey-like qualities and facial features 
meant to insinuate that they are less human, less evolved, and thus brutal, dumb, and 
uncivilized (Appendix C).  Nazi description and propaganda targeting Eastern peoples 
and Jews was very much in the same vein. 
Nazi agents were the perpetrators of the campaign of mass-murder organized 
by the leadership.  Their ineffectiveness to question their actions led to heinous acts of 
evil, rarely witnessed throughout history.  Their dehumanization of and lack of 
attachment to their victims made their tasks seem mundane and routine.  Their pledge 
of loyalty to their leader and their devotion to the vision of the Volk placed them in a 
culture in which their moral ideals were reordered.    
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Conclusion 
Knowing that the acceptance of culture is dependent upon both external and 
internal factors, closer looks must be taken, not only at Germany and its politics, but at 
the world as a whole.  The formation and results of Nazism and their German origins can 
be written off neither as a German problem nor as one that will never again be 
capable of coming to fruition.30  The popularity of extremist left and right wing forms of 
government grows to its greatest potential during times of hardship, as people seek 
strong leadership capable of bringing them fast results.  They actively seek to, again, 
escape their own lives and are much more susceptible to new levels of indoctrination.  
This was true in the case of Adolf Hitler. 
John Lukacs, in his work June 1941, makes the following observation: 
The Germans whom Hitler inherited were the most educated people in the world.  
The peoples whom Stalin came to rule were not.  That is why the fanaticism and the 
brutality and the mass killings ordered by Hitler and committed by Germans were, 
and have remained, more shocking and unexpected than the brutalities and murder 
ordered by Stalin and committed by his underlings; and that, too, is why Hitler remains 
more interesting and more extraordinary than Stalin (and National Socialism than 
Communism)(45).   
                                                          
30 An often mistaken belief amongst Americans is that the Great Depression of the 1930‟s was 
cured by the enactment of Franklin D. Roosevelt‟s New Deal policies, on the contrary and 
though not intended, it was ultimately attributable to the production of war goods much as was 
the case in Nazi Germany where it was in fact the original solution.  During these trying times 
many influential Americans, including publisher William Randolph Hearst, did in fact call for 
dictatorial leadership.  Within FDR‟s own inaugural address he stated that he would seek “broad 
executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be 
given to [him] if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe” (Roosevelt). 
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The Germans whom Lukacs calls “the most educated people in the world” are no less 
susceptible to fanatical indoctrination than less educated peoples.31  That Hitler and 
Nazi Germany are so closely analyzed on a whole is also a testament to the power of 
seduction created by situational forces. 
 The culture that has been described was not impermeable.  There were those 
who stood up to the Nazis, and many who refused to adopt the Nazi culture.  Many 
elements of the regular army are examples of this because they were kept separate 
from domestic issues.  The fact that Erwin Rommel‟s Afrikakorps was not guilty of any sort 
of atrocity is a tribute both to the man, and to the theater (Showalter).  Rommel, widely 
considered one of the few professional soldiers under Nazi command, was routinely 
given orders to execute captured Jews, whether they were inhabitants of captured 
cities or British prisoners of war, which he subsequently ignored.  Even on the Eastern 
Front Wehrmacht units at times refused to hand over captured cities to the 
Sonderkommando (task force) because it soon became clear that these auxiliaries 
were charged with liquidating the Jewish populations (Langerbein 39).   
 Another example of the new culture not taking hold is the use of alcohol and its 
widespread use in the East.  The use of alcohol was most often implemented by Hiwis, 
understandably so given their lack of discipline and the fact that they often handled 
the most gruesome tasks.  Even SS units as well as their auxiliaries were often guilty of 
using alcohol.  The fact that many executioners were forced to resort to substance 
abuse when committing these atrocities is a tribute to the argument that in many cases 
                                                          
31 This common misconception is attributable to Americans today who think that all terrorists are 
dumb or uneducated, yet the Christmas Day bomber who attempted to explode a commercial 
airliner over Detroit, MI in 2009 purportedly had not become radicalized until sometime after he 
received his degree from a London university.  
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the new, culturally acceptable actions did not set in entirely within their conscious 
minds.  In other words, their actions challenged their moral values, but they chose to 
proceed anyways, because these moral values had been reworked making the 
influence of factors such as obedience stronger than the desire not to commit murder.  
That being said however, the use of mind-altering substances does not always 
evidence a paltry existence of culturally tolerable actions.  In many cases it might also 
have been used merely as a means of making one‟s, for lack of a better word, work 
seem less tedious. 
 The ideas expressed here are not all about German problems, but are 
attributable to our contemporary world as well.    Democratic society, especially 
Western democracy, is cosmopolitan.  That is to say people are different, and from 
these differences there is much to learn.  The cosmopolitan neither desires nor expects 
that every person or society converge on a single mode of life (Appiah xv).  Though we 
live in a state of constant change and globalization, there are still isolationist countries 
such as North Korea who live in contrast to our yearning for a cosmopolitan world, and 
whose control system has been in effect far longer than that of the Nazis.  Its citizens live 
their lives in a state of ignorance towards the outside world, and view this outside world 
with a high level of distaste which has been stimulated by their leaders and their 
education.  Another example exists in the decentralized realm of Islamic extremism, 
notably Wahabism, which also controls its agents with a philosophy of rule wrought with 
singularity.  They live in a culture that I and others would have to join or be forced into it, 
whereas they are born accepted, by the reasonable person, into my cosmopolitan 
society. 
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 The case study presented here of the Nazi control system‟s creation of culture is 
an historical example of this singular way of thinking.  Its leaders and subjects existed 
within a bubble, the pluralist societies peering in.         
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Appendix A 
 
 
(Willmott, Cross, & Messenger 131) 
A film poster for Der ewige Jude or The Eternal Jew.  The film, made in 1940, was an 
attempt to prepare the population for the deportation of the Jews.  It was a message 
of pure hate, juxtaposing images of Jews with rats in order to justify their extermination.  
Many felt the film went too far in this regard, and it was relatively unpopular.  Though its 
intended effect never came to fruition, it did serve to strengthen the populace‟s feeling 
of deindividuation.  Much as was the reaction to Kristallnacht, many took solace in the 
fact that they were not like the Nazis, whose barbarity had again gone too far, and felt 
detached from the impending genocide.   
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Appendix B 
 
 
Retrieved from: <http://www.headinjurytheater.com/article27.htm> 
 
A still from a Disney production exhibiting anti-Nazi propaganda.  It is intended to 
depict the Nazi ideology as a cruel, strict society, focused upon unbridled dedication to 
the Führer.  Contrast this still with that of the Japanese man. 
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Appendix C 
 
Retrieved from: <http://www.headinjurytheater.com/article27.htm> 
 
A still from a short Disney film meant as anti-Japanese propaganda.  Notice how the 
facial features portray monkey-like qualities, yet this person is wearing glasses. 
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